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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
district court's denial of his motion to

Eric Michael Ross appeals from
suppress evidence.

In the district court, he asserted that, following a traffic stop,

officers illegally searched luggage in the trunk of the car he was driving. The district
court denied the motion, and Mr. Ross entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count
of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine,
which preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April 2014, Mr. Ross was pulled over for failing to signal for a full five seconds
before changing lanes. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.31, L.16 - p.32, L.1, p.88, L.12

p.89, L.11.)

Ultimately, after almost 50 minutes, the officers seized his luggage in the trunk and
searched it on the theory, according to one of the deputies, that "I don't know what's in
those bags. Could potentially be something to harm me or my partner." (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 (hereinafter, Video) at 50:30 - 54:00; Tr. 9/30/14, p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.5.)
Kootenai County Sheriff's Deputies Gorham and Hyle were working as part of a
"criminal interdiction unit" at the time of the stop. (Tr. 9/30/14 p.29, L.19 - p.30, L.1.) At
the suppression hearing, they testified that upon approaching the vehicle, they noticed
that Mr. Ross and his passenger, Mr. Cummings, were "nervous"; that a "wooden
handle that appeared to be for an axe without the blade" lay on the floorboard; and that
the passenger was talking on his cell phone telling someone they had been pulled over.
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.34, L.17 - p.36, L.12, p.90, Ls.5-14.)

When Deputy Gorham asked

Mr. Ross for his license and registration, Mr. Ross explained that the car was a rental

1

and that he only had his ID card with him (Tr. 9/30/14, p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.3.) Mr. Ross
explained that he lived in Montana with Alex Hunter, the person who had rented
the car. 1 (Video at 4:15 - 4:30.) When Mr. Ross could not find the rental agreement
anywhere in the car, Deputy Gorham said he would call the rental company to ask
about the car's status. (Video at 4:30- 6:10.)
At that point, Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross to step out of the car. (Tr. 9/30/14,
p.34, Ls.11 - 16.) He testified that people are not usually talking on the phone when he
pulls them over, and when he stops people whom he thinks are nervous, it leads him to
believe "criminal activity may be afoot .... '' (Tr. 9/30/14, p.34, L.17 - p.35, L.6.) This
prompted him to tell Mr. Ross to get out of his car because, as he testified, he liked to
get people "out of the comfort zone," and "put them in my comfort zone where I feel
more comfortable with them." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.35, Ls.4-9.)
After Mr. Ross stepped out of the car, Deputy Gorham asked him if he had any
weapons on his person, and Mr. Ross told him he had a pocket knife.

(Tr. 9/30/14,

p.65, Ls.2-3.) Deputy Gorham asked Mr. Ross to put the pocket knife back in the car,
and Mr. Ross complied.

(Tr. 9/30/14, p.65, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Ross also consented to be

frisked for additional weapons.

(Tr. 9/30/14, p.65, Ls.9-13.) Deputy Gorham found

nothing during that frisk and then asked Mr. Ross to sit with him in the front seat of the
patrol vehicle. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.37, Ls.12-23.) Once in the vehicle, Mr. Ross told Deputy
Gorham that his driver's license was suspended. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.39, Ls.11-12.)

A

background check revealed no outstanding warrants and no violent prior offenses.

At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ross also testified that Mr. Hunter was his "best friend
and boss." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.22, Ls.19-23.)
1

2

9/30/14, p.68, L.21 - p.69, L.15.) According to Deputy Gorham, although dispatch
told him of a drug-related history, "I don't remember saying that he came back with any
violence.

(Tr. 9/30/14, p.69, Ls.11-13.) Further, Deputy Gorham described Mr. Ross's

demeanor throughout the process as "very cordial." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.67, Ls.6-17.)
Dispatch also informed Deputy Gorham that the rental company confirmed that
the car had been rented to Alex Hunter and that Mr. Ross was not a driver authorized
by the rental car company. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.77, Ls.13-18, p.44, Ls.13-14.) At this point,
Deputy Gorham issued Mr. Ross a citation for driving without privileges, which Mr. Ross
signed. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.67, Ls.6-13.) Deputy Gorham then called an employee of the
rental car company, who requested the car be towed to their offices. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.44,
L.9 - p.45, L.8.) But Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross he was going to "impound" the car,
so Mr. Ross asked to get his luggage out of the trunk. 2 (Tr. 9/30/14, p.69, L.16 - p.70,
L.6.) Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that he could only have his luggage if he first
allowed the deputies to search it. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.70, Ls.7-9.)
When asked why he would not give Mr. Ross his property, Deputy Gorham said
that "based off everything that I've seen and the weapons we've located so far ... I
didn't feel safe giving his stuff back without first conducting a search for weapons .... "
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.45, Ls.17-21.) When asked to expand on why he was fearful, Deputy
Gorham repeated that the men seemed nervous to him, referenced their drug-related
criminal backgrounds, and made the statement that, because he did not know what was

Deputy Gorham testified that he told Mr. Ross he was free to go at this point.
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.69, Ls.19-25.) However, in the video, there is no indication that Deputy
Gorham made this statement until approximately 25 minutes later. (See Video at 25:20
- 25:50, 49:00 - 49:15.)
2

3

Mr. Ross's belongings, there could potentially be something to harm him or his
According to Deputy Gorham, "drugs and

(Tr. 9/30/14, p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.

weapons and violence all generally the same crime. A lot of drug-related crimes that
stem from violence or drugs and weapons and guns." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.46, L.16 - p.47,
1.)

Mr. Ross did not consent to have his bags searched. 3 (Tr. 9/30/14, p.46,
Ls.5-10.) Ultimately, Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that he could pick up his property
from the rental car company, after Mr. Ross agreed to leave his bags in the trunk and
told Deputy Gorham that the duffel bag in the trunk belonged to Mr. Hunter. 4
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.49, Ls.3-14, p.46, Ls.7-10.)

Deputy Gorham then told Mr. Ross he

would be performing an inventory search of the bags. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.49, L.21 - p.50,
L.B.)

It had, at this point, been almost 25 minutes since Deputy Gorham issued

Mr. Ross the citation for driving without privileges and told him that the car would be
towed. (Video at 25:20 - 25:50, 49:00 - 49:15.) Mr. Ross was never issued a citation
for failing to signal a lane change for a full five seconds.
As Mr. Ross and Mr. Cummings walked down the highway to meet someone who
was picking them up, the deputies immediately began searching through the luggage.
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.49, L.21 - p.50, L.2, p.51, L.8 - p.52, L.2; Video at 52:50.) None of them
were completing any paperwork or possessed any forms whatsoever for the completion
of the so-called inventory search. (Video at 52:50 - 53:30.) Deputy Hyle testified at the
suppression hearing that the Sheriff's department protocol required that forms be filled

Mr. Cummings consented to a search of his backpack, and Deputy Gorham searched
it before letting him take it. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.46, Ls.5-7.)

3

4

out when doing an inventory search and that his role was completing that paperwork.
9/30/14, p.92, Ls.11-23.) The video, however, clearly shows that this did not occur.
(Video at 52:50 - 53:30.)
In their search through the duffel bag, the deputies discovered a small pink
handgun and an aerosol can that contained what Deputy Gorham believed to be
methamphetamine.

(Tr. 9/30/14, p.51, L.25 - p.53, L.21.) The deputies then drove

back down the highway and arrested Mr. Ross and Mr. Cummings. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.54,
Ls.2-7.) After that, the deputies returned to the car and conducted a "probable cause
search

of the

vehicle,"

during

which

they found

a digital

scale

and

more

methamphetamine. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.54, Ls.8-24.)
Mr. Ross was initially charged with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm,
one count of trafficking in methamphetamine, one count of driving without privileges and
a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.104-06.) He filed a motion to suppress the
evidence found in the car, but the district court denied the motion
202.)

(R., pp.50-51, 192-

It held that: the initial stop was justified 5 ; Mr. Ross did not have standing to

contest the search; and, even if Mr. Ross did have standing, the length of his detention
was

not

unreasonable,

and

the

search

was

reasonable.

(R.,

pp.192-202.)

Subsequently, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Ross entered a conditional Alforc/3
plea to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and a conditional plea to one
count of trafficking in methamphetamine.

(Tr. 11/12/14, p.114, L.2 - p.120, L.20.)

At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ross testified that all the bags in the trunk belonged to
him. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.27, L.8 - p.28, L.8.)
5 Mr. Ross is not challenging the justification for the traffic stop.
6 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
4

5

Mr. Ross then filed a Notice of Appeal that was timely from
Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right

AppeaL (R., pp.220-23.)

6

district court's

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross's motion to suppress because
he had standing
challenge the reasonableness
his detention and the search
of the car?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross's motion to suppress because
the deputies unlawfully extended the traffic stop?

3.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ross's motion to suppress because
Deputy Gorham would not let Mr. Ross take his luggage without searching it first,
and the inventory search was not performed according to protocol?

7

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress Because He
Had Standing To Challenge The Reasonableness Of His Detention And The Search Of
The Car

A.

Introduction
The district court held that Mr. Ross did not have standing to contest the search

of the car. However, it also held that if Mr. Ross was found to have standing, he was
not illegally detained.

Thus, the district court implied that Mr. Ross did not have

standing to contest either his detention or the subsequent search. Mr. Ross not only
had standing to challenge the reasonableness of his detention, he also had standing to
contest the search because Mr. Ross's friend gave Mr. Ross permission to drive the
car.

8.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court employs a bifurcated

standard. State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1998). The Court accepts the
trial court's determination of fact if supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews
"the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. Thus, the Court
has free review as to whether the police officer's actions were permitted under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution. State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 604 (Ct. App. 1993).
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress
Because Mr. Ross Had Standing To Challenge The Reasonableness Of His
Detention And The Search Of The Car
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section
17 of the Idaho Constitution protect ''[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right
is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). Searches or
detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v.

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129
(Ct. App. 2002).
A traffic stop is a seizure of the driver in a vehicle and "is therefore subject to
Fourth Amendment strictures, but because it is limited in scope and duration, it is
analogous to an investigative detention." State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App.
2008). "Because a seizure results in restrictions to an individual's personal freedom,

any individual in a seized vehicle has standing to challenge the validity and
reasonableness of the stop."

State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 6 (Ct. App. 2009)

(emphasis added) (citing State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406 (1984)).

Therefore,

Mr. Ross had standing to challenge the reasonableness of his detention.
With respect to the search of the car, because the authorized driver of the car,
Mr. Hunter, gave Mr. Ross permission to drive the vehicle, Mr. Ross had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of the car. The United States Supreme Court has

9

held that the test for determining whether a defendant has standing or the "capacity to
the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . .

upon whether the person

who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place."

Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S

128, 143 (1978)

The Court has

developed a two-prong test for finding a legitimate expectation of privacy: first, a
defendant must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, the
subjective expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively
reasonable. United States v Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). However, neither Rakas
nor Katz provided significant guidance to lower courts in determining what expectation
of privacy society would deem reasonable where a rental car is concerned.
The Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v Cutler, 144 Idaho 272 (Ct App. 2007),
analyzed various approaches used by the federal circuit courts of appeals. It noted that
the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits employed a bright-line rule, which looked only to
whether the driver was listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement.
274.

Id. at

If the driver was not listed on the agreement, "even if he or she has permission

from a person who is an authorized driver," the driver "has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle and consequently lacks standing to complain of the vehicle's
subjection to an allegedly unlawful search." Id. The Cutler Court also pointed out that
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits used a "modified view of the bright-line approach" which
only requires an unauthorized driver to show he or she has permission from the renter
to use the car in order to have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id.
Finally, the Court of Appeals explained that the Sixth Circuit, in United States v.

Smith, 263 F .3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001 ), employed a totality of the circumstances
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analysis, which it then adopted. Id.
determine standing

Id.

It held that five factors should be considered to

Those were: "(1) whether the defendant had a driver's

license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (3) the
driver's ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver has the lessee's
permission to use the car; and (5) the driver's relationship with the rental company." Id.
Ultimately, the court held that Mr. Cutler did not have standing because, unlike the
defendant in Smith, there was no indication that Mr. Cutler knew the authorized driver,
Mr. Cutler did not have a relationship with the rental company, and the rental agreement
had expired. Id. at 275-76.
Notably, Judge Lansing's concurrence in Cutler shed light on the factor that the
court considered the most important and why the totality approach was adopted. Judge
Lansing said, "I write separately to express my view that in the vast majority of cases,
the question whether the driver of a rental car had direct permission to use the car from
the lessee or from a contractually authorized driver will be dispositive of the standing
question." Id. at 276. Thus, Judge Lansing's "initial impulse" was to adopt the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits' position that permission from the renter grants standing. Id. In fact,
she went on to say that "[t]he existence of such permission should ordinarily be
sufficient to confer a privacy interest upon the driver if and to the same extent that the
lessee possesses such a privacy interest" Id. However, she said that the totality of the
circumstances test was appropriate because there could be a "rare circumstance where
a legitimate privacy interest may arise even in the absence of direct permission from the
lessee or other authorized driver." Therefore, it is clear that the other factors would be
significant and necessary only when there is no permission from the authorized driver.

11

In this case, the district court said that "[a)t no time in his testimony did Ross
directly assert that he had Hunter's verbal permission
original).)

(R., p.200 (emphasis in

Therefore, the district court found that Mr. Ross "did not prove he had

Hunter's permission ... " (R., p.200.) This was clearly erroneous because it was not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. See State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557,
560 (Ct. App. 2005). Indeed, at the hearing on the suppression motion, Mr. Ross made
it clear that Mr. Hunter gave him permission to use the rental car. When asked how he
got the car from Mr. Hunter, Mr. Ross said, "At his house. He handed me the keys, told
me he couldn't go and gave it to me." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.23, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Ross's counsel
then asked if Mr. Hunter made any objection to Mr. Ross taking the car, and Mr. Ross
confirmed he did not. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.23, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Ross also confirmed that he
was operating the car with Mr. Hunter's permission. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.23, Ls.18-20.)
The district court acknowledged that these

statements were made but

nevertheless held that Mr. Ross did not have permission from Mr. Hunter. (R., p.200.)
It is not clear what the district court believed was necessary to show permission, but no
authority supports the idea that specific language must be used to grant permission.
Indeed, Mr. Ross's recollection of his discussion with Mr. Hunter represents what is
likely a normal series of events when an authorized driver grants permission to a friend.
It would be highly unusual for an authorized driver to say to his friend "I hereby grant
you permission to use the rental car."
Additionally, this case is distinguishable from Cutler.

In that case, Mr. Cutler

stated that he was given permission to drive the car by Mr. Stewart, who was given
permission to use it by the actual renter, Mr. Hernandez. Cutler, 144 Idaho at 273. The

12

said that "[t]here was no evidence presented regarding the relationship between
and Hernandez, the only authorized driver-including whether they even knew
each other." Id. at 275.

As such, the court found that there was "no evidence that

Cutler even had permission from the only authorized driver .... " Id. Thus, the court
said that the case "presented significantly more attenuated relationships" than the Sixth
Circuit was presented in Smith.

Again, unlike the situation in Cutler, Mr. Ross knew

Mr. Hunter well.
Nevertheless, the district court found that Mr. Ross did not have Mr. Hunter's
permission, and, because there was "no evidence that Ross had an intimate
relationship with Hunter," the district court said "[n]one of the four factors in Smith" were
"present in the instant case." (R., p.199.) The district court failed to comprehend the
purpose of the one factor that examines the relationship between the driver and the
lessee.

When discussing that factor, the only reason that the Smith court stated that

Mr. Smith had an "intimate relationship" with the actual renter was because the renter
was Mr. Smith's wife.

Smith, 263 F.3d at 586.

It is obviously not necessary for an

unauthorized driver to have a familial relationship with the authorized driver. The
"relationship with the driver" factor simply considers the nature of the relationship.

In

other words, if the driver has no relationship with the renter, as was the case in Cutler, it
is less likely that society would recognize the driver's expectation of privacy as
legitimate. Here, Mr. Ross made it clear at the suppression hearing that Mr. Hunter was
his best friend and boss. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.22, Ls.19-23.) He also told Deputy Gorham
that he lived with Mr. Hunter. (Video at 4: 15 - 4:30.)

13

It was clear that Mr. Ross had Mr. Hunter's permission, and he knew Mr. Hunter
As

privacy that society would recognize as

, he had an expectation

objectively reasonable. Further, given the discrepancy between the facts in this case
and those of Cutler, and the importance of the authorized driver's permission, Mr. Ross
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the car. Therefore, the district
court erred when it found that Mr. Ross did not have standing to contest the search.
11.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress Because The
Deputies Unlawfully Extended The Traffic Stop
A.

Introduction
The district court erred in denying Mr. Ross's Motion to Suppress because

Mr. Ross's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police officers prolonged his
detention. Mr. Ross was detained well after the purpose of the stop was completed.
Therefore, the deputies unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress
Because The Mission Of The Stop Was Over When Deputy Gorham Told
Mr. Ross That The Car Would Be Towed
Mr. Ross was pulled over for failing to signal a full five seconds before changing

lanes. That detention lasted almost 50 minutes. 7 "An investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."

Mr. Ross was pulled over two minutes into the video, and Deputy Gorham did not tell
him he was free to leave until 47 minutes later. (See Video at 1:45 - 2:15, 48:45 49:15.)
7
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Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
420 (2005).
The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated this admonition when it held
that law enforcement cannot extend a completed traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff
without reasonable suspicion.

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614

(2015). The Court specifically stated that "a police stop exceeding the time needed to
handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield against
unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation,
therefore, 'become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete th[e] mission' of issuing a ticket for the violation."

Id. at 1612 (quoting

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S at 407). The Court made it clear that unless there was
additional reasonable suspicion, the officer had to allow the seized person to depart
once the purpose of the stop was completed. Id. at 1614.
The Court acknowledged that "[t]raffic stops are 'especially fraught with danger to
police officers,' so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome
precautions in order to complete his mission safely."

Id. at 1616 (emphasis added)

(quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009)). The Supreme Court explained
in Rodriguez that "[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that
mission. So too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours."

Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (internal citation omitted).

Therefore, although some

investigative detentions are permissible when based on specific, articulable facts that
justify reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, see e.g. State v. Perez-Jungo, 156
Idaho 609, 614 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)), safety
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precautions taken to facilitate investigations into other potential crimes detour from the
purpose of the stop, and such detours are unlawful.
That is exactly what happened here. The mission of this traffic stop ended when
Deputy Gorham issued Mr. Ross a citation for driving without privileges and told
Mr. Ross that the rental car company required that the car be towed. Everything that
happened beyond that point, particularly Deputy Gorham's insistence on searching
Mr. Ross's bags, was a detour taken in an attempt to discover evidence of other crimes.
Not only was keeping Mr. Ross's luggage not supported by any authority, it was an
unlawful extension of the stop under the pretext of officer safety.
Nevertheless, the district court held that the length of the stop was reasonable.
(R, pp.200-01.) It said,
Once stopped, the officers had the ability to confirm the
identification of the drivers. Once Ross provided identification, the officer
was allowed to check his driving status. That check provided the basis for
the additional detention to issue a citation. Once Ross disclosed the fact
that this was a rental car and that he lacked the rental agreement and the
ability to drive the vehicle, that allowed for an additional period of
detention for the officers to contact the rental company and find out what
they wanted done with the rental car. The length of the detention was not
unreasonable given what unfolded sequentially.
(R., pp.200-01.)
The district court completely ignored the events that took place in the 25 minutes

after Deputy Gorham spoke with the rental car company. Indeed, had Deputy Gorham
released Mr. Ross when he found out what the rental car company wanted, the
detention up to that point would have been reasonable. That did not happen.
Instead, as the video makes clear, when Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that the
car would be impounded, Mr. Ross asked if he could take his bags. (Video at 25:40.)
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Instead of letting him take them, Deputy Gorham detained ML Ross for an additional 25
minutes because the deputy refused to let him take his belongings unless he consented
to their search.

During that time, the deputies kept Mr. Ross separated from

Mr. Cummings, and Deputy Hyle questioned Mr. Cummings regarding his address and
phone number even though there was no evidence that Mr. Cummings had committed
any crimes. (Video at 48:00

49:00.)

Deputy Gorham also asked dispatch if there

were any canine units in the area and was told that they were both in training. (Video at
40: 15 - 40:45.) Not surprisingly, he then told Mr. Ross that an "inventory search" would

be necessary. (Video at 51 :45 - 51 :55.) The deputies' actions after the purpose of the
stop was completed were not supported by any reasonable suspicion that a crime had
been or was about to be committed; any such suspicion that arose because Mr. Ross
was not the renter of the car had been allayed by the records check and the call with the
rental car company. Thus, the deputies' actions demonstrated that the deputies were
bound and determined to search to find some evidence of criminal activity. This was a
clear detour from the mission of the stop.

Therefore, the stop violated well settled

Supreme Court precedent, most recently reiterated in Rodriguez, and was unlawfully
extended.

111.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress Because
Deputy Gorham Would Not Let Mr. Ross Take His Luggage Without Searching It First,
And The Inventory Search Was Not Performed According To Protocol

A

Introduction
The district court erred when it held that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),

justified a search of Mr. Ross's luggage.
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The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ross's Motion To Suppress
Because Deputy Gorham Told Mr. Ross That He Had To Consent To A Search
Of His Luggage If He Wanted To Take The Luggage With Him, And The
Deputies Did Not Follow Proper Protocol For An Inventory Search

1.

The District Court Erred When It Held That The Deputies Could Search
Mr. Ross's Luggage For Officer Safety Reasons

Despite the fact that the purpose of the traffic stop was completed, and Deputy
Gorham did not have probable cause to justify a warrantless search of Mr. Ross's
luggage, Deputy Gorham told Mr. Ross that he could have his luggage only if he
consented to a search of that luggage. This was illegal.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1 Section
17 of the Idaho Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right
is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by
governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against
arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002). Searches or
detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971 ); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129

(Ct. App. 2002).

To overcome this

the burden of

establishing that ''the warrantless search

within a well-recognized exception to the

warrant requirement." State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007) (abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416 (2014)). Additionally, "the state must show
that even if the search was permissible

an exception to the warrant requirement,

it must still be reasonable in light of all

surrounding circumstances." Id.

18

The district court held that the luggage search in this case was justified under
v. Ohio.

(R., p.201-02)

However, Terry does not justify searches of luggage.

Such a search must be justified by probable cause. See e.g. State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894, 897-98 (1991 ).

Nevertheless, the district court said, "Deputy Gorham's

request to allow a search for weapons, if Ross was allowed to take his luggage, was
reasonable given the circumstances." (R., p.201.) It described those circumstances as
follows:

there was an axe handle in the car; Mr. Ross had a pocket knife;

Mr. Cummings was talking on his cell phone and said that he had been stopped by the
police; Mr. Ross "laughed unusually," and seemed nervous; Mr. Cummings was
nervous and "seemed to have a sense of urgency on the phone when explaining they
were stopped by the police"; Mr. Ross had prior drug convictions, and his license was
suspended for eluding an officer; and Mr. Ross could not produce the rental agreement
and "did not provide any direct evidence that he had the permission of the person who
rented the car."

(R., p.201.)

Based on these facts, the district court said Deputy

Gorham,
knew that if he released Ross and Cummings with their luggage, without
searching that luggage, he would be putting himself in a situation where
his attention would be divided between doing an inventory search, and
needing to keep an eye out for two persons he had just released who may
be leaving with weapons in their luggage and who may have a reason to
inflict harm on Deputy Hyle and himself.
(R., pp.201-02.)

Therefore, the district court held that, under Terry, Deputy Gorham

was justified in searching the luggage. (R., p.202.)
Terry grants no such authority to law enforcement officers. Terry does not justify

the search of luggage. It does not justify an extended detention of this nature, and it
certainly does not justify a law enforcement officer forcing an individual to waive his
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Fourth Amendment rights in order to leave with his property after a traffic stop. The
Terry Court specifically stated that when an officer reasonably believes "the persons

with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, the officer may be
"entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which

might be used to assault him." Id. at 30 (emphasis added). This does not authorize a
search of belongings simply because, as Deputy Gorham said, "I don't know what's in
those bags." The law does not support such a dismantling of the Fourth Amendment.
Deputy Gorham frisked Mr. Ross before he had him get in the patrol car. If Terry
justified searches of luggage in the trunk of a car as the district court held, then law
enforcement officers making any traffic stop could detain an individual to search all
containers in the car if the driver had a prior record, behaved nervously, and had
something that could be used as a weapon

in the passenger compartment.

Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals has said that "because it is common for people
to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of
criminal activity, a person's nervous demeanor during such an encounter is of limited
significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion." State v. Gibson, 141
Idaho 277, 285-86 (2005) (citing Brent v. Ashley, 247 F.3d 1294, 1302 (11th Cir.2001);
United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir.1998); United States v. Fernandez,

18 F.3d 874,879 (10th Cir.1994)).
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that law enforcement is a
dangerous job. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. Despite such dangers, the Court said
that safety precautions taken to facilitate on-scene investigation into other crimes
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"detours" from the mission of the traffic stop. Id This is precisely what occurred here.
As argued to the district court, "The police cannot simply say the words 'officer safety'
and have them become a talismanic shield obviating the need to apply and uphold the
Article I, Section 17 safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure." (R., p.189.)
Furthermore, the district court's conclusion that, given the facts, "a reasonably
prudent man would have felt his safety was at issue, that 'he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual .... "' was not supported by the
facts.

(R., p.202.)

Mr. Ross and Mr. Cummings were cooperative during the entire

course of the stop; Mr. Ross promptly stepped out of the car when directed to do so;
Mr. Ross "submitted to a frisk of his person" without argument, and no weapons or
contraband were found; the deputies did not feel it was necessary to detain either of the
men with handcuffs; Deputy Gorham asked Mr. Ross to sit in the front seat of the patrol
vehicle; Mr. Ross admitted his driver's license was suspended; the rental vehicle was
not stolen; the records check did not reveal that Mr. Ross had a history of violent
crimes; and at no time did Mr. Ross or Mr. Cummings act aggressively or communicate
any threat to the deputies. (R., pp.188-89.) Indeed, Mr. Ross was, according to Deputy
Gorham, "very cordial." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.67, Ls.6-17.)
In short, officers cannot simply claim that a detained person might have and use
weapons in luggage, especially when there are many facts that would dispel such a
notion. This stop also took place in broad daylight on Interstate 90. (Tr. 9/30/14, p.31,
Ls.3-8.)

Thus, as Mr. Ross's counsel argued below, the deputies "did not have

sufficient objective and articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that Ross'
luggage contained a weapon and that, if it did, that such was a legitimate threat to their
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safety." (R., p.189.) Allowing searches of luggage based on hunches in order to make
jobs safer would swallow the

2.

Amendment

The Inventory Search Was Not Performed According To Established
Protocol, And The State Failed To Prove That The Search Was
Reasonable

The deputies tried to justify the search of Mr. Ross's luggage as an inventory
search. When a car is lawfully impounded, law enforcement is permitted to inventory its
contents. "Such warrantless inventory searches, when conducted in compliance with
standard and established police procedures and not as a pretext for criminal
investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable
searches and seizures." State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290 (1995) (citing Colorado v.

Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75
(1976); State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80-81 (1991 )). Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court has said that established protocol "must regulate the opening of
containers found during inventory searches" because "an inventory search must not be
a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Florida v.

Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); see also Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375.
Here, Deputy Gorham testified that impounding a rental car and performing an
inventory search prior to the car being towed to a rental car office was standard policy.
(Tr. 9/30/14, p.83, Ls.5-7.) The questioning went as follows:
Q:

Well, what is your understanding of your authority to conduct an
inventory?

A:

My understanding is every time we tow a vehicle it's being
inventoried is the policy at Kootenai County.

Q:

And what does that mean?
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A:

It means every time we authorize a vehicle to be impounded it will
be inventoried.

Q·

Again, what does it mean to inventory it?

A:

Search the entire contents for items of value

Q:

And what's the purpose of that?

A:

Like I stated before, I don't know the purpose of it, that's above my
pay grade, but I imagine it's a liability issue.

(Tr. 9/30/14, p.83, Ls.3-16.) The State never proved that there was an inventory policy
regarding the search of closed containers.

It did not file an exhibit to that effect.

argument was based solely on Deputy Gorham's testimony.

Its

In its briefing, it simply

said, Deputy Gorham's "inventory was in accordance with the departmental policy of the
sheriff's office at the time." (R., p.80.) This is exactly what the United States Supreme
Court was concerned about in Bertine and Wells.

Without a clear policy, there is no

regulation of searches, and what can be searched is left to the discretion of law
enforcement. In Bertine, the State proved there was a policy allowing the opening of
closed containers and, therefore, the search of a closed container was constitutional.

Id. at 374. In Wells, the Court held that, because there was no policy at all, the search
of a closed container was unlawful. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4-5.
The district court apparently assumed without deciding that there was a policy
and that Deputy Gorham followed that policy because it made no findings with respect
to whether the inventory search was conducted according to department policy, or the
well-established standards articulated in Wells and Bertine, even though Mr. Ross's
counsel raised the issue in his briefing, and the State responded. (See R., pp.135-37,
179-80.)
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More importantly, Deputy Hyle testified that his role in an inventory search was
completing the inventory paperwork.

9/30/14, p 92, Ls.11-1

He said,

"I

completed the inventory paperwork." (Tr. 9/30/14, p.92, L.13.) This is not supported by
the evidence. Indeed, the video shows that the search had none of the earmarks of a
proper inventory search.

(Video at 52:45 - 53:30.)

Deputy Hyle was definitely not

completing any paperwork, and Deputy Gorham simply rummaged through the luggage
in the trunk until he found something incriminating. The video makes it obvious that,
much like Deputy Gorham's insistence that he be allowed to search the luggage for
safety, the inventory search was also a pretext to pursue a hunch that there was
contraband in the luggage. This was not an inventory search. No one documented the
contents of the luggage; the deputies simply poked through the luggage, looking for
something incriminating. Therefore, the search was illegal.

3.

All Evidence Collected Following Mr. Ross's Prolonged Detention And The
Unlawful Inventory Search Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The
Illegal Governmental Activity

The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963); State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 249 (1990).

The test is

"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
488. Suppression is required if "the evidence sought to be suppressed would not have
come to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct."
142 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct App. 2005).
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State v. Wigginton,

Deputies illegally prolonged Mr. Ross's detention after the mission of the stop
was completed.

Further, as Mr. Ross's counsel argued below, Deputy Gorham's

"insistence on consent to a search" before allowing Mr. Ross to take his property "left
Ross facing the dilemma of consenting to a search thereby waiving his right to privacy
under Article I, Section 17 (and the Fourth Amendment) before taking it with him, or
abandoning his property and thereby also subjecting it to search through the inventory
process." (R., p.136.) Finally, the search itself was clearly unlawful because it was not
conducted pursuant to established protocol but was simply a ruse so the deputies could
do an investigatory search of Mr. Ross's property. The State failed to meet its burden of
showing that the search was reasonable and that the evidence was untainted; therefore,
all the incriminating evidence collected must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police
activity.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ross respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment
and sentence, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand the case
to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2015.
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